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Crewmen Under Contract to PrQfessional Salvor May 
Claim Salvage Award-Nicholas E. Vernicos 
Shipping Co. v. United States* 
Several United States Navy store ships imperiled during a violent 
squall off the Greek coast were aided by two tugs outfitted with 
special salvage equipment and owned by Greek companies terming 
themselves professional salvors. The tug crewmen were the firms' 
fulltime employees; they were expected to undertake salvage work 
when available and to engf1ge in ordinary harbor towing between 
salvage operations. The owners sued the United States on behalf of 
themselves and their crews to recover compensation for assisting the 
Navy. The district court, finding that the store ships had been ren• 
dered a salvage service, made separate awards to the owners and to 
each crewman aboard the Greek vessels during the operation.1 On 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. 
The crewmen of a vessel owned by a professional salvor who engage 
in salvage on a regular but non-exclusive basis may receive modest 
salvage awards when the "conscience of admiralty" is moved to grant 
them. 
A salvage service is any voluntary assistance which is at least 
partially successful in relieving property upon navigable waters 
from impending peril.2 The one who gives aid of this nature is a 
salvor, and his compensation is a salvage award, payment of which is 
secured by an automatic lien upon the salvaged ptoperty.8 Because 
courts have long realized that a general willingness to rescue dis-
tressed property at sea is beneficial to the shipping industry, salvage 
awards have been consistently liberal.4 Originally only those persons 
who h._1d physically participated in a salvage venture and had borne 
the brunt of the hazards involved were entitled to awards. As the 
vessels from which the salvors worked became more expensive, it 
seemed advisable to make awards to the owners in order to induce 
them to risk their capital in salvage operations. At the same time, 
crew awards were reduced, since the more modern vessels were safer 
and most of the dangerous phases of an operation were accomplished 
by machinery. At present the owner's award is generally larger than 
that of all the crewmen combined.5 While much salvage is still ac• 
complished by chance rescuers, there are a number of vessels in 
service today specially outfitted for salvage work, manned by full-
• 349 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1965) (hereinafter cited as principal case). 
I. Nicholas E. Vemicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963). 
2. The Clarita and The Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) I (1874). 
3. Jacobson v. Panama Ry., 266 Fed. 344 (2d Cir. 1920). 
4. See The Lamington, 86 Fed. 675 (2d Cir. 1898). 
5. See generally GILMORE 8: BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 8-11 (1957). 
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time crews, and kept ready for immediate service. Their owners 
normally receive generous awards because these craft are unusually 
efficient. 6 
At issue in the principal case was the right of members of the 
crew of nV'o such professional salvage vessels to claim a salvage award. 
The court reviewed the few precedents on the question but dismissed 
them as inconclusive. In this the court was correct, for a thorough 
survey reveals that the prior cases contain nothing but conclusions 
or dicta supported only by misinterpretations of previous cases.7 
The court then attempted to evaluate the equities of the parties.8 
Testimony showed that the wage rate of the tugs' crewmen was 
lower than that of their counterparts on conventional Greek harbor 
tugs, even though the former regularly worked at ordinary harbor 
towage between salvage operations. The court believed, however, 
that this evidence, even if accurate, could give rise to either of two 
inferences. A lower pay scale, while possibly indicating the crew-
men's expectation of receiving salvage awards, might, ori the other 
hand, merely show their willingness to work for lower compensa-
tion.0 It further appeared that, generally speaking, the risk of physi-
6. See The Lamington, 86 Fed. 675 (2d Cir. 1898). 
7. One of the earliest cases bearing on the question of professional crew awards is 
Bowley v. Goddard, 3 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 1736) (D. Mass. 1867), where the court noted 
in a dictum that, although the crewmen of the salvage vessel involved in the litigation 
had contracted for specified wages to cover all their services, they still acted voluntarily 
in assisting the salvaged vessel. In The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448 (1869), the 
Court held that the owner's right to an award did not abate because his professional 
crew had made no claim. It did not go to the merits of the professional crew award 
question. Relying upon this decision the court in Browning v. Baker, 4 Fed. Cas. 453 
(No. 2041) (E.D. Va. 1875), ruled that the crew's failure to claim a share of the award 
indicated its concession of the entire award to the owner. In dictum, however, the 
court suggested that no crew award would have been permissible because the seamen 
were under contract with the owner. 
Apparently the leading case for the proposition that a professional crewman can 
waive his claim to a salvage award is The Cetewayo, 9 Fed. 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1881). The 
court did not explain the proposition; it did refuse, however, to find a waiver because 
there was no showing that the crew engaged in salvage on a regular basis. The court 
in The Celtic Chief, 4 Hawaii Fed. 299 (9th Cir. 1916), suggested that a waiver was not 
to be implied merely from the fact that a seaman was a professional salvage crewman, 
and allowed a crew award because no evidence of actual waiver had been introduced. 
The Arakan, 283 Fed. 861 (N.D. Cal. 1922), cited in the principal case, stated by way 
of dicta, unsupported by either authority or reasoning, that professional salvage crew-
men are ineligible for awards. 
8. Admiralty courts have traditionally used broad discretion in determining the 
amount of salvage awards. See 33 LAw MAGAZINE&: REv. 300 (1908). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the court in the principal case considered relying upon its sense of 
fairness when forced to determine eligibility for an award. 
9. The court did not suggest why the crews would be willing to accept the lower 
rate of compensation. In some instances professional salvage crewmen receiving regular 
wages work at salvage only occasionally, remaining idle between operations. See gener-
ally NORRIS, SALVAGE § 81, at 134 n.10 (1958). In the principal case, however, the crew-
men worked full time, engaging in harbor towage when salvage work was unavailable. 
Principal case at 471. 
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cal injury to any professional salvage crewman is lessened by the 
specialized equipment on board his vessel.1° 
The court did not find in the evidence before it any overwhelm-
ing reason for either allowing or denying a crew award. Nevertheless, 
it concluded that a modest crew recovery should be permitted in 
the instant case simply because the "conscience of admiralty" was 
so disposed.11 Although salvage claims are usually negotiated or 
arbitrated,12 the ad hoc nature of the court's decision may lead sal-
vage crewmen, or the owners or insurers of salvaged property, to take 
future disputes to the federal courts whenever they consider the 
equities of the particular situation favorable to their position. 
Prediction of the outcome of future salvage litigation may be 
facilitated by a thorough review of the professional salvage crew 
award question. Such compensation has sometimes been opposed on 
the theory that the seaman, by becoming a professional salvage crew-
man, impliedly either abandons any claim to an award in favor of 
accepting steady employment on a salvage vessel, or else bargains the 
potential claims away in consideration for his wages.18 These argu-
ments seem untenable in light of present-day maritime law, which 
finds admiralty courts playing the role of the seaman's guardian, pro-
tecting him from abuse and overreaching by his employer.14 It seems 
anomalous that the same tribunals which place upon the shipowner 
an affirmative burden of showing that a release executed by an 
injured crewman was signed with full knowledge of the extent of 
his injuries as well as of his rights to maintenance, cure, and dam-
ages15 should be disposed to hold that a seaman impliedly gave up a 
potential salvage claim-at least without determining whether he 
knew the nature of his rights and understood that he was foregoing 
them. A similar paternalism was manifested by Congress in enacting 
sections 600 and 601 of the Shipping Code,18 which invalidate 
IO. In the principal case the salvage vessels towed the distressed ships to a mooring 
and then, after tying them up, pushed against them to relieve pressure on the mooring 
lines. The crews' physical efforts played a very small part in the operation. Sec 
Nicholas E. Vernicos Shipping Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
11. Principal case at 471. 
12. Schimski, Arbitration of Marine Claims at Lloyd's, 12 ARB. J. (n.s.) 96 (1957), 
13. See note 7 supra. 
14. See Norris, The Seaman as Ward of the Admiralty, 52 MICH. L. REv. 479 (1954). 
15. Id. at 487. 
16. REv. STAT. § 4535 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 600 (1964), reads in part: "[E]vcry stipu-
lation by which any seaman consents to abandon his right to his wages in the case of 
the loss of the ship, or to abandon any right which he may have or obtain in the 
nature of salvage, shall be wholly inoperative." 38 Stat. 1169 (1915), as amended, 46 
U.S.C. § 601 (1964), reads in part: "[N]o assignment or sale of wages or of salvage made 
prior to the accruing thereof shall bind the party making the same." Seamen engaged in 
the coastal trade are excepted from the coverage of § 600 by the Act of June 9, 1874, 18 
Stat. 64, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 544 (1964). 
None of this legislation could be binding in the principal case because the crew-
men and the owners of the salvage vessels were Greek nationals, the vessels were of 
Greek registry, and the events giving rise to the litigation occurred outside the juris-
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certain express attempts by seamen to abandon or assign their salvage 
rights prior to accrual. This legislation would certainly seem to 
suggest a national policy against a court's finding an implied relin-
quishment of the same rights. 
In the principal case, however, the United States appears not to 
have argued any type o_f renunciation theory. Instead, it maintained 
that the crewmen did not act "voluntarily" toward the naval vessels, 
since they were regularly employed for the purpose of saving dis-
tressed property. This contention goes to the question of whether a 
particular person has rendered a salvage service as defined by admi-
ralty law,17 rather than to the eligibility of one admittedly a salvor 
to receive an award. 
The flaw in the Government's argument lies in giving too narrow 
a definition to the word "voluntary." The mere hope of gain, for 
example, does not render service to distressed property involuntary,18 
nor does the fact that the rescuer was motivated by the instinct of 
self-preservation.19 In fact, previous cases indicate that a salvage 
claimant's service is "involuntary" only if he has a pre-existing duty 
to either the imperiled property or the community to lend assistance. 
A crewman, for example, cannot ordinarily become the salvor of his 
own ship, for he has contracted · to serve the craft at all times irre-
spective of the hazard involved.20 Public policy is also .furthered by 
this rule, since one ineligible for a reward is not tempted to allow his 
ship to become imperiled so that he can salvage her.21 In theory, at 
least, passengers cannot be salvors, since they have an obligation, 
albeit an extrem~ly limited one, stemming from their contract of 
carriage, to help their ship in distress.22 A duty to the public at large 
diction of the United States. Principal case at 467. See generally Lauritzen v. Larsen, 
345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
The scope of this note does not embrace the questions which may arise when a 
professional salvage crewmai:i expressly agrees to forego any salvage claim which may 
accrue to his benefit. 
17. See text accompanying note 2 supra. . 
18. See NoRIUS, op. cit. supra note 9, § 69. There is authority suggesting that a 
professional salvage crewman can act voluntarily toward the distressed vessel. Bowley v. 
Goddard, 3 Fed. Cas. 1072 (No. 1736) (D. Mass. 1867). 
19. The Lomonosoff, [1921] P. 97 (dictum). 
20. E.g., The Tashmoo, 48 F.2d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); The Neptune, I Hagg. 227, 
166 Eng. Rep. 81 (Adm. 1824). Under unusual circumstances where the crew has acted 
beyond the call of duty, the crewmen may receive a salvage award. The Mary Hale, 
16 Fed. Cas. 985 (No. 9213) (S.D. Fla. 1856). One author summarizes these situations 
as follows: where their ship was absolutely abandoned without hope of recovery, where 
she was totally lost by shipwreck and either went to the bottom or "left her bones on 
the shore," where she was taken by a hostile power and later recaptured by the crew, 
or where the crew was mistakenly discharged from service prior to salvage. NoRIUS, op. 
cit. supra note 9, § 52. 
21. See Elrod v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 62 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). 
22. The Vrede, Lush. 325, 167 Eng. Rep. 143, 144 (Adm. 1861) (Lushington, J.). The 
passenger's duty to his ship, of course, is much less exacting than that of the crew. He 
may desert the vessel at any time. Furthermore, he is thought to be acting above the 
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for whom he works makes "involuntary" the assistance rendered by 
a government servant in the usual scope of his employment. Thus, 
harbor firemen or Coast Guardsmen bound by law, regulation, or the 
nature of their offices to rescue distressed property at sea cannot 
normally be salvors.23 Another policy is thereby implemented: the 
conduct of public servants will remain untainted by the hope of 
personal reward.24 Professional salvage crewmen, however, are not 
bound by contract to the distressed vessel, nor have they agreed to do 
the public's bidding. Indeed, it is anomalous to say that these seamen 
had an obligation to either the imperiled craft or the community 
which would make their assistance "involuntary," when the owner 
of their tug, by whose will their activities were governed, had no 
similar obligation.25 
On the other hand, there are cogent reasons for allowing a modest 
award to professional salvage crewmen. Salvage awards are made in 
the hope that the prospect of compensation will encourage those 
in a position to do so to engage in salvage operations and to carry 
them out as efficiently as possible.26 While the professional salvage 
crewman will no doubt be prompted by the contract with his em-
ployer to lend aid as the latter directs, the expectation of remunera-
tion over and above his usual wages will motivate him to expend his 
utmost effort. A crew award also serves the best interests of the sal-
vage vessel's mvner, for the greater the value of the salvaged property 
the larger his own compensation is likely to be.27 Furthermore, the 
0\vner faces the possibility of receiving little or no award if the value 
of the property is lessened through the crew's negligence or inten-
tional misconduct.28 Presumably a crew award would be computed 
on the basis of the same considerations used to assess the owner's. The 
risk of losing all or part of their mvn award would provide the crew-
men with an added incentive to perform carefully and diligently, 
thereby lessening the chance of the owner's award being dimin-
ished because of their misfeasance. 
Although there are good reasons for allowing professional salvage 
crew awards and no convincing arguments for prohibiting them, 
call of duty and, thus, eligible for a salvage award, when he does more to assist than 
simply operate the ship's machinery. See The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352 (1883); Towle 
v. The Great Eastern, 24 Fed. Cas. 75 (No. 14,110) (S.D.N.Y. 1864). 
23. The Lyman M. Law, 122 Fed. 816 (D.C. Me. 1903) (dictum) (Coast Guardsman); 
Davey v. The Mary Frost, 7 Fed. Cas. 14 (No. 3592), affirming 7 Fed. Cas. II (No. 3591) 
(E.D. Tex. 1876) (fireman). 
24. Thornton v. The Livingston Roe, 90 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
25. It is clear that the owner of a professional salvage vessel is entitled to an 
award. See, e.g., The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448 (1869). The government did not 
contend that the owners of the tugs in the principal case were not volunteers. 
26. Mason v. The Blaireau, 16 Fed. Cas. 1009 (No. 9230) (D. Md. 1803). 
27. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869). 
28. See Danner v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
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these seamen are paid by their employers for engaging in salvage
operations and should not be compensated twice for the same effort.O
To avoid double remuneration, the court should deduct from the
amount it would allow each crewman were he not under contract
with his employer, computed with reference to the same considera-
tions traditionally taken into account when setting the amount of a
chance rescuer's award,30 a sum equal to the value of the contractual
benefits each has received attributable to the particular salvage opera-
jion.31 In this way the crewman's reward will approximate the value
of his service over and above that expected of him in his daily deal-
ings with his employer-the very service which a professional salvage
award is designed to encourage.
29. See Slone v. Udle, 6 Newf. Sup. Ct. 217 (1880); cf. text accompanying notes 26 &
27 supra. However, the amount of compensation apart from the award seems irrelevant
in determining whether a salvage claimant was a volunteer. See The Tashmoo, 48 F.2d
366 (E.D.N.Y. 1930); note 7 supra.
30. "Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circumstances as the
main ingredients in determining the amount of the reward to be decreed for
a salvage service: (1). The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the sal-
vage service. (2). The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in renderng the
service and saving the property. (3). The value of the property employed by the salvors
in rendering the service, and the danger to which such property was exposed. (4). The
risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending peril. (5). The
value of the property saved. (6). The degree of danger from which the property was
rescued." The Blackwell, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 13-14 (1869).
31. A particular crewman's regular befiefits may include more than just the amount
of wages paid him during the time he was actually engaged in a particular operation.
For example, a seaman may receive a monthly wage from the professional salvor but
be expected to engage solely in salvage work and, of course, only when it is available.
See note 9 supra. Assuming that he were called to work an average of only one time
per month, a court could well determine that a full month's pay and fringe benefits
are properly attributable to each salvage operation.
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